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T he	end	of	 the	Cold	War	has	a	 lot	 to	do	with	 the	greater	 at-tention	 the	 world	 now	 gives	 to	 humanitarian	 grievances.	Unexploded	 ordnance	 impact	 data	 has	 been	 accumulating,	
but	without	the	precedent	of	the	anti-personnel	mine	campaign	and	
the	Ottawa	 Convention,1	 the	 Belgians	 would	 probably	 never	 have	
considered	banning	cluster	munitions	in	2006.	
Most	 of	 the	 ICBL’s	 1,00	members	 have	 limited	 themselves	 to	
APM	eradication,	victim	assistance	and	other	Convention	goals,	but	
Tied	Campaigns:	
Cluster	Munitions,	
Explosive	Remnants	of	War	
and	Anti-personnel	Landmines
by Robin Collins [ World Federalist Movement–Canada ]
The cluster munitions campaign, following 
the precedent of the International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines, is beginning to make 
an impact on state views of banning or 
restricting cluster munitions. This article 
examines the history behind the fight to ban 
or restrict cluster munitions and its ties to the 
ICBL. The author also discusses the most 
recent developments in the process to ban 
or restrict cluster bombs.
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The roof of a building after a BLU-97 strike in Iraq. Deminers are clearing 
unexploded munitions so the building can be used as a shopping centre.
have	not	yet	rallied	in	similar	numbers	to	the	cluster-munitions	effort.	
The	Cluster	Munition	Coalition,	formed	in	late	2003,	has	approxi-
mately	170	members.	Many	of	the	CMC’s	members	and	leadership,	
however,	are	 seasoned	campaigners.	Familiar	 to	 ICBL-watchers	are	
Handicap	 International,	Human	Rights	Watch,	 Landmine	 Action	
(UK),	Mines	Action	Canada	and	Pax	Christi,	who	are	among	those	
sitting	on	CMC’s	10-member	steering	committee.
The CCW
The	ICBL	and	 its	dynamic	partnership	with	 like-minded	APM	
ban	states	(the	Ottawa	Process)	was	an	innovative	and	collaborative	
way	 of	 quickly	 moving	 the	 ban	 agenda	 forward.	 Disappointment	
with	 the	 existing	 Convention	 on	 Certain	 Conventional	Weapons2	
consensus	rule	(where	a	single	recalcitrant	state	can	dilute	or	block	
Convention	provisions	supported	by	the	majority)	led	to	the	new	par-
allel	process.
The	parties	 to	the	Ottawa	Process	 focused	on	the	 idea	that	hu-
manitarian	impact	can	trump	military	utility.3	This	idea	was	not	new	
because	international	humanitarian	law	and	an	array	of	treaties	from	
the	mid-100s	onwards	already	referred	to	obligations	towards	civil-
ians	 during	 conflict,	 containing	 such	 ideas	 as	 proportionality,	 dis-
tinction,	discrimination,	military	necessity	and	humane	treatment.	
The	CMC	effort	has	followed	the	precedent	of	the	ICBL,	strug-
gling	through	the	slow	CCW	process	and	challenging	the	stragglers.	
If	cluster-munition	campaigners	were	unprepared	for	the	inadequacy	
of	the	prevention	measures	of	the	Convention’s	Protocol	V	that	were	
agreed	to	by	governments,	they	have	sober	expectations	about	their	
Red spray paint warns villagers of a cluster bomb along a path in Ton Neua Village, 
Laos, 1994.
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Abatement,	 which	 utilizes	 country	 assess-
ments.	As	an	enhancement	to	the	standard	
assessment	process,	the	WRA	program	seeks	
to	 develop	 concurrent	 plans,	 in	 coordina-
tion	with	the	various	country	hosts,	to	assist	
using	 a	 fast-track	 approach	 so	 that	 serious	
threats	 can	be	addressed	much	more	expe-
ditiously	 than	 with	 other	methods.	Under	
this	 methodology,	 as	 country	 assessments	
reveal	 threats,	 the	 information	 is	 shared	
with	 the	 host	 country	 and	 discussions	 in-
clude	 possible	 solutions	 to	 the	 threats.	 As	
the	 assessments	 continue,	 the	 solution	 sets	
are	fine-tuned,	and	 it	quickly	becomes	ob-
vious	 which	 option	 is	 best	 to	mitigate	 the	
specific	threats.	Once	the	solution	is	mutu-
ally	agreed	upon	by	the	Department	of	State	
and	 the	host	 country,	 the	 same	 teams	 that	
are	 conducting	 the	 assessments	 can	 be	 ex-
panded	to	handle	the	implementation.	
The	benefits	of	 this	 improved	approach	
are	 numerous	 but	 include	 faster	 response	
to	 identified	 threats,	 a	 more	 cost-effective	
mitigation	 of	 threats,	 a	 fast-tracked	 time-
line	(the	same	teams	expand	to	handle	 the	
solution;	 there	 is	a	minimal	 learning	curve	
for	 personnel)	 for	 response,	 and	 ongoing	
host-country	 buy-in	 to	 the	 solution.	 The	
Department	of	State	has	done	an	admirable	
job	 in	 constructing	 a	 highly	 efficient,	 re-
sponsive,	 accretive	 and	 timely	 program	 for	
weapons	removal	and	abatement.	
In	conclusion,	there	is	an	irrefutable	rela-
tionship	between	landmines	and	other	rem-
nants	 of	 war.	 Their	 origins	 are	 completely	
independent;	 their	 technology	 and	 cost	
components	are	quite	different;	their	general	
manufacturing	and	deployment	sources	are	
different;	 but	 both	 excel	 as	 weapons	 since	
the	 effectiveness	 of	 any	 weapon	 depends	
upon	two	factors:	
1.	 Its	ability	 to	damage	or	destroy	men	
and	materiel	
2.	 The	morale	effect	of	its	use,	or	threat	
thereof,	upon	the	enemy
Both	of	these	threats	have	many	names,	
and	 I	 am	 certain	 someone	 somewhere	 is	
thinking	up	a	new	name	for	landmines	and	
other	explosive	remnants	of	war.	Regardless	
of	the	new	tortured	phrases	we	will	be	forced	
to	endure,	let	us	not	forget	that	“A	rose	by	
any	other	name	would	smell	as	sweet,”	but	
these	threats	are	the	thorns	of	the	rose.
See Endnotes, page 110
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Targeting Landmines Focuses on Latin America
Targeting Landmines is a project created by Vinicius Souza and Maria Eugênia Sá of MediaQuatro 
designed to begin a global discussion on and generate governmental support for mine awareness, 
mine clearance and victim assistance initiatives. The group presented its first exhibit for the 
Targeting Landmines project in January 2006 in Caracas, Venezuela. The exhibition took place 
as part of the World Social Forum. 
The body of work uses photos, articles and documentary materials to disseminate information 
and spark interest for the Latin American landmine problem. Partial funding for the project 
has been provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross, but more support will be 
necessary soon for the project to fulfill its goals. Through extensive work with several hu-
manitarian organizations operating in Colombia, Peru and Ecuador, MediaQuatro will continue to 
document the breadth of the landmine issue in Latin America.
To learn more about Targeting Landmines, view some of the riveting images, and contact the 
artists, visit: http://mediaquatro.sites.uol.com.br/minas-eng.html.
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required	 by	 the	 manufacturer.	 Typically	
he	will	 be	 flying	 at	 the	 correct	 speed,	 ori-
entation	 and	 altitude	 to	 ensure	 optimum	
performance.	 In	 a	 combat	 situation,	 that	
same	 pilot	 may	 be	 operating	 at	 night	 and	
under	 enemy	fire.	The	 target	 area	may	 in-
clude	 buildings	 or	 woodlands	 and	 the	
ground	 surface	may	 vary	 from	 concrete	 to	
swamp.	Submunitions	may	be	dispersed	at	a	
height	that	does	not	allow	them	to	complete	
the	arming	process	before	landing;	they	may	
strike	 trees	 or	buildings	 that	prevent	 them	
landing	 in	 the	 intended	 orientation.	 They	
may	 also	 land	 on	 a	 surface	 that	 swallows	
them	up.”1	
Emergence of a Cluster Munitions 
Campaign
At	 the	Lugano,	Switzerland,	conference	
of	 experts	 organised	 by	 the	 International	
Committee	 of	 the	 Red	 Cross	 in	 1976,	 13	
states16	concentrated	on	the	lethal	footprint	
of	cluster	munitions	and	the	horrific	conse-
quences	for	civilians	nearby.	However,	core	
cluster-bomb	 user-states	 did	 not	 sign	 onto	
the	Lugano	statement	and	there	was	no	ref-
erence	to	detonation	failure	rates.	The	criti-
cal	experience	in	Laos	and	Vietnam	was	that	
cluster	bombs	had	been	targeted	at	or	near	
noncombatants.17	Many	of	the	deaths	from	
UXO	were	yet	to	come.	While	the	Lugano	
conference	did	not	establish	a	cluster-bomb	
campaign,	 it	 (and	 the	Lucerne	 conference)	
did	 lead,	 ultimately,	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 the	
CCW	in	190.	Except	through	advocacy	by	
the	 Mennonite	 Central	 Committee	 (with	
clearance	work	by	Mines	Advisory	Group	in	
Laos)	and	Human	Rights	Watch,	the	prob-
lem	of	cluster	munitions	might	have	 fallen	
entirely	 out	 of	 sight.	 The	 campaign	 spark	
came	somewhat	later.	
Ottawa Convention Impact
Thirty	 million	 submunitions	 were	
dropped	 in	 the	 1991	Gulf	War,	 resulting	
in	 thousands	 of	 untargeted	 victims—and	
yet	 there	 was	 no	 sustained	 public	 outcry.	
Cluster	 munitions	 casualties	 in	 Kosovo	
(1999)	 and	 Afghanistan	 (2001),	 however,	
did	 receive	 attention,	 as	 did	 munition	
failure	 rates	 (normally	 an	 esoteric	 subject	
area).1	 The	 news	 media	 were	 quick	 to	
highlight	 the	 similarity	 in	 appearance	 of	
cluster	munitions	and	yellow	food	packag-
es	dropped	 into	Afghanistan	 (a	 confusion	
that	actually	had	rare,	if	any,	consequenc-
es).19	 In	 Canada,	 where	 I	 live,	 members	
of	 Parliament	 had	 to	 respond	 to	 inquiries	
about	 cluster	 bombs	 in	 question	 period.20	
Government	ministers	were	forced	to	make	
contradictory	 statements.	 The	 European	
Parliament,	 for	 its	 part,	 took	 a	 stand	 in	
favour	 of	 a	 moratorium.	 So	 what	 had	
changed	since	the	Gulf	War?
The	 link	 between	 renewed	 interest	 in	
cluster	munitions	and	the	international	suc-
cess	of	the	APM	ban	campaign	is	unmistak-
able.	The	ICBL	and	Ottawa	Convention	had	
highlighted	the	unacceptability	of	weapons	
detonated	by	innocent	victims	either	direct-
ly	(death	and	injury)	or	indirectly	(socioeco-
nomically).	All	weapon	use	after	the	Ottawa	
Convention	bears	 a	new	 level	 of	 scrutiny.21	
For	 many	 campaigners,	 this	 was	 the	 best	
possible	result.
The Pace Picks Up
At	 an	 International	 Committee	 of	 the	
Red	 Cross	 experts’	 meeting	 in	 Nyon,	
Switzerland,	 in	 September	 2000,	 ex-
plosive	 remnants	 of	 war	 were	 officially	
put	 on	 the	 agenda.	 Colin	 King’s	 break-
through	 report,	 Explosive Remnants of 
War: A Study of Submunitions and Other 
Unexploded Ordnance,22	 was	 circulated.	
Nongovernmental	organisations	and	govern-
ments	met	informally,	and	there	was	“wide-
spread	 recognition”23	 of	 the	ERW	problem	
and	a	need	to	address	it.
In	December	 2001	 at	 the	 final	 plenary	
review	 conference	 of	 the	 CCW,	 the	 ICBL	
issued	 its	 first	 clear	 statement	 in	 support	
of	 those	 calling	 for	 “a	 moratorium	 on	 the	
use,	 production	 and	 trade	of	 cluster	muni-
tions.”2	This	was	a	delicate	moment	for	the	
ICBL,	 where	 many	 felt	 that	 their	 priority	
was	completing	work	in	progress	on	APMs.	
While	 the	 Mennonite	 Central	 Committee	
and	Human	Rights	Watch	had	been	publicly	
campaigning	 for	 a	 moratorium	 on	 cluster	
munitions	 (sometimes	by	 themselves)	 for	 a	
couple	of	years,	most	other	member	groups	
were	quiet.2	There	was	 some	 concern	 that	
formally	 linking	a	 cluster-munitions	 initia-
tive	to	the	landmine	campaign	would	threat-
en	partner	governments	that	had	signed	the	
AP	 Mine	 Ban	 Convention.	 Would	 link-
age	 jeopardize	 universalising	 the	 Ottawa	
Convention?	 Some	 governments	 had	 to	
wonder	 if	 the	 campaign	 was	 now	 spilling	
over	into	non-APM	weapons.	Where	would	
it	stop?	
The	 contrary	 argument,	 which	 was	
the	 one	 that	 eventually	 led	 to	 the	 ICBL’s	
December	 2001	 statement,26	 was	 that	 the	
credibility	 of	 a	 campaign	 in	 pursuit	 of	 a	
norm	 against	 victim-activated	 weapons	
would	be	put	 in	 jeopardy	without	 formally	
recognizing	 and	 condemning	 the	 cluster-	
munitions	 problem.	 The	 ICBL	 decided	 to	
encourage	 its	 “members	 and	 supporters	 to	
work	 to	 alleviate	 the	 humanitarian	 impact	
of	 cluster	 munitions	 and	 other	 explosive	
remnants	of	war.”26
Recent Developments
Virgil	 Wiebe,	 a	 consultant	 to	 the	
Mennonite	 Central	 Committee	 and	 law	
professor	 at	 the	University	 of	 St.	 Thomas,	
described	a	key	presentation	by	the	U.S.	rep-
resentative	at	the	CCW	in	November	200	
as	 “a	 jaw-dropping	 moment.”	 The	 official	
borrowed	heavily	from	a	recent	task	force	re-
port	that	had	found	no	identifiable	“compre-
hensive	approach—empirical	observation	or	
otherwise—to	 determine	 and	 document	
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A BLU-26 cluster bomb peeks out of a rice paddy dike in Nanou Village, Laos, 2000.
prospects	now	at	the	CCW.	At	a	minimum,	
preventing	 UXO	 meant	 establishing	 ac-
ceptable	 failure	 rates,	 banning	 certain	 fus-
ing	 configurations	 and	 destroying	 aging	
stockpiles.	 But	 no	mandatory	measures	 to	
prevent	UXO	(including	cluster	munitions)	
appeared	in	the	final	text.	Instead,	it	stated,	
“Each	High	 Contracting	 Party	 is	 encour-
aged	 to	 take	 generic	 preventive	 measures	
aimed	at	minimising	 the	occurrence	of	ex-
plosive	 remnants	 of	 war”	 and	 “Each	High	
Contracting	Party	may,	on	a	voluntary	ba-
sis,	exchange	information	related	to	efforts	
to	 promote	 and	 establish	 best	 practices”	
(emphasis	added).
Protocol	V	is	far	off	the	mark,	but	cam-
paigners	 continue	 to	 press	 governments	
to	 sign	 on	 as	 a	 first	 step	 to	 recognising	 a	
problem.	Some	nongovernmental	organisa-
tions	now	mull	over	the	idea	of	an	“Ottawa	
Process”	 to	 deal	 with	 cluster	 munitions.	
While	 not	 discounting	 any	 future	 process	
outside	 the	 CCW,	 Human	 Rights	 Watch	
has	 called	 for	 a	 new	 protocol	 focussed	 on	
cluster	 munitions:	 “The	 mandate	 and	 the	
protocol	 should	be	broad,	 and	 should	deal	
with	both	the	technical	reliability	issues	and	
the	targeting	and	use	issues.	…	[A]	new	pro-
tocol	 should	 prohibit	 the	 use	 of	 unreliable	
and	 inaccurate	 submunitions	 and	 require	
their	 destruction.	 The	 billions	 of	 unreli-
able	 and	 inaccurate	 submunitions	 already	
in	 the	 arsenals	 of	 more	 than	 70	 nations	
are	 the	 primary	 humanitarian	 concern.	
They	must	never	be	used	 in	order	to	avoid	
a	humanitarian	and	socioeconomic	disaster	
exceeding	that	created	by	millions	of	 land-
mines	globally.”
Human	Rights	Watch,	one	of	a	handful	
of	 early	 adopters,6	was	willing	 to	call	 for	 a	
moratorium	 on	 cluster	munitions	 in	 1999,	
and	in	2003	it	named	a	specific	list	of	prob-
lematic	cluster	weapons	 that	 should	not	be	
used	in	Iraq	because	of	their	known	hazard-
ous	failure	rates.7
Explosive Remnants of War
Even	before	the	Ottawa	Convention	was	
signed,	 deminers	 and	 mine-clearance	 and	
other	organisations	recognized	as	self-evident	
a	 danger	 from	 weapons	 with	 similar	 char-
acteristics	 to	 anti-personnel	 mines.	 There	
came	 a	 proposal	 from	 the	 International	
Committee	of	the	Red	Cross	that	campaign-
ers	and	governments	should	look	at	all	explo-
sive	remnants	of	war,	a	grouping	that	initially	
included	unexploded	cluster	munitions,	anti-
tank/anti-vehicle	 mines	 and	 APMs,	 anti-
handling	 devices,	 artillery	 shells,	 bombs,	
grenades,	booby	traps	and	even	missiles.
Explosive remnants of war	 captured	 the	
boundaries	 of	 the	 contagion,	 but	 not	 all	
unexploded	 ordnance	 posed	 an	 equal	 risk.	
Some	 were	 more	 visible	 and	 more	 preva-
lent	 and	 others	 were	 less	 likely	 to	 explode	
inadvertently.	 Some	 had	 greater	 military	
utility,	which	made	 their	 prohibition	more	
difficult.	The	ERW	nomenclature	has	been	
a	useful	and	creative	approach	to	underlin-
ing	 similar	 humanitarian	 effects	 caused	 by	
a	broad	range	of	munitions.	It	resulted	in	a	
new	CCW	Protocol	 (Protocol	V),	 but	 one	
with	 few	 obligations	 on	 member	 states.	
Governments	 eschewed	 specific	 preventive	
measures	for	fear	that	more	of	their	arsenal	
would	subsequently	be	scrutinised,	 restrict-
ed	or	prohibited.	The	United	Kingdom,	 in	
its	March	 200	 presentation9	 to	 the	 ERW	
experts’	 working	 group,	 while	 defending	
the	 military	 utility	 of	 cluster	 weapons	 as	
an	 area-effect	 weapon,	 readily	 admitted	
current	 models	 were	 problematic.	 (They	
did	not,	however,	 commit	 to	 their	 immed-	
iate	withdrawal.10)	
A	significant	strike	against	cluster	muni-
tions	is	their	rivalry	with	APMs	for	highest	
number	 of	 unintended	 victims.	 In	parts	 of	
the	world	(Laos,	for	instance),	the	sheer	num-
ber	of	 failed	cluster	munitions	poses	a	haz-
ard	as	great	as	or	greater	than	anti-personnel	
mines.11	 A	 2002	 survey	 by	 the	 Geneva	
International	 Centre	 for	 Humanitarian	
Demining	found	the	“data	available	on	the	
casualties	of	ERW	and	percentage	of	UXO	
cleared	 again	 shows	 a	 greater	 bias	 toward	
the	two	main	groups—anti-personnel	mines	
and	 cluster	 bomblets	 (submunitions).	 It	 is	
probably	the	case	that	they	are	responsible	
for	 most	 of	 the	 casualties	 in	 some	 post-
conflict	environments.”12	
By	 a	 process	 of	 elimination,	 then,	 the	
effort	to	address	ERW	has	quickly	come	to	
focus	primarily	on	one	subgroup	(aside	from	
APMs)	with	the	most	serious	humanitarian	
impact:	cluster	munitions.
Failure Rates
Cluster	 casualties	 were	 sometimes	
the	 consequence	 of	 munitions	 that	 erred	
from	 their	 target	 or	 that	 were	 dropped	
close	 to	 noncombatants—but	 it	 is	 their	
high	 failure-to-detonate	 rate	 that	 makes	
them	 potential	 ERW.	 Official	 failure	
rates	 of	 cluster	 munitions	 often	 varied	
from	 the	 numbers	 recorded	 in	 the	 real	
world.	 Rae	 McGrath	 reported	 in	 his	 re-
source	 book,	 Landmines and Unexploded 
Ordnance,13	that	the	1966	tests	of	BLU-26	
submunitions	 at	Nellis	Air	Force	Base	 in	
ideal	circumstances	revealed	a	26-percent	
failure-to-explode	rate	after	deployment.
Colin	 King,	 an	 international	 landmine	
and	explosive	ordnance	disposal	consultant,	
pointed	 out,	 “Gulf	 War	 I	 clearly	 demon-
strated	a	major	discrepancy	between	perfor-
mance	during	military	‘acceptance	tests’	and	
operational	use.	…[N]early	2,000	electron-
ic	mines	 remained	unexploded	 in	 the	U.S.	
clearance	 sector	 alone,	 despite	 achieving	
near-perfect	results	during	testing.”1	
Similarly,	 demining	 consultant	 Andy	
Smith	 notes,	 “Formal	 tests	 take	 place	 on	
hardpan	 and	with	 the	 pilot	 able	 to	 deploy	
the	CBU	[cluster	bomb	unit]	in	the	manner	
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Unexploded cluster munitions litter grazing land in Xieng Khouang province, Laos, 1994. 
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M ines	 and	 explosive	 remnants	 of	 war	 continue	 to	 affect	many	parts	of	 the	world.	One	 such	area	 is	 the	Horn	of	Africa,	where	wars	have	continued	for	the	better	part	of	
the	20th	 century.	U.N.	Security	Council	Resolution	1320	 formally	
established	 the	 United	 Nations	 Mission	 in	 Ethiopia	 and	 Eritrea	
in	November	 2000.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	U.N.	 Security	Council	
formally	 established	 a	 Mine	 Action	 Coordination	 Centre	 within	
the	United	Nations	Mission	in	Ethiopia	and	Eritrea.	The	resolution	
requires	the	MACC	to	coordinate	and	provide	technical	assistance	for	
humanitarian	mine	action	activities	in	the	TSZ1	[temporary	security	
zone]	and	area	adjacent	to	it.
History of the Mine and ERW Problem
The	mine	and	ERW	problems	of	Eritrea	and	Ethiopia	stem	from	
three	historical	periods.	Eritrea	was	colonised	by	the	Italians	in	the	
19th	 century.	 During	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 Italian	 and	 British	
forces	 fought	 a	 number	 of	 battles	 across	 Eritrea,	 culminating	 in	 a	
major	siege	on	the	town	of	Keren	in	191,	which	lasted	nearly	three	
months.	These	battles	were	 fought	 in	a	conventional	manner,	 con-
sisting	of	 aerial	 bombardments,	 artillery,	 small-arms	fire	 and	mine	
emplacement.	Certain	areas	around	Keren	are	considered	hazardous	
today	due	to	suspected	contamination	by	mines	and	unexploded	ord-
nance,	particularly	in	the	hills	surrounding	the	township.	Keren	was	
the	scene	of	a	major	battle	again	during	the	independence	war	years	
between	1961	and	1991.
After	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 Eritrea	 was	 governed	 by	 Great	
Britain	until	 the	early	190s,	when	 it	was	handed	over	 to	Ethiopia	
to	be	part	of	the	federation	system;	annexed	by	Ethiopia,	Eritrea	be-
came	its	northernmost	province.	There	was	a	resurgence	of	Eritrean	
nationalism	in	the	early	1960s	when	the	Eritrean	population	began	
Mines	and	ERW	
by Bob Kudyba [ UNMEE MACC ]
Due to the history and nature of conflicts in 
the Ethiopia/Eritrea area, cleanup presents 
specific considerations and hazards. The 
lessons learned by the United Nations 
Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea Mine Action 
Coordination Centre in mine/explosive 
rem-nants of war cleanup are presented, 
as well as recommendations on clearance 
operations for situations with mixed mine/
ERW like that in Ethiopia and Eritrea.
an	 insurgent	 campaign	 for	 independence	 against	Ethiopian	 forces.	
This	rebellion	gradually	developed	into	a	more	conventional	war	as	
the	Eritreans	gained	support	for	their	cause,	won	key	battles	and	held	
ground.	This	struggle	for	independence	lasted	30	years	and	affected	
the	entire	country.	The	Eritrean	struggle	for	independence	is	possibly	
one	of	the	most	successful	examples	of	a	liberation	war.	Eritreans	are	
justifiably	proud	of	the	establishment	of	their	country,	as	it	was	won	
at	great	cost	to	the	population	and	without	“outside”	help	or	support	
from	other	nations.
After	 the	 state	 of	 Eritrea	 was	 established	 in	 1993,	 following	 a	
U.N.-monitored	 referendum	 in	 which	 the	 population	 voted	 over-
whelmingly	for	independence,	the	relationship	between	Eritrea	and	
Ethiopia	was	cordial.	This	relationship	continued	until	several	issues	
soured	 it,	 including	 the	 introduction	of	a	new	currency,	 the	nakfa,	
which	replaced	the	Ethiopian	birr.	The	situation	eventually	deterio-
rated	into	a	war	lasting	from	199	to	2000	over	non-demarcated	bor-
ders.	Then	in	2000,	Algiers	brokered	a	peace	accord.	
This	 border	 war	 was	 an	 intense	 conflict,	 with	 both	 sides	 em-
ploying	 conventional	war	 strategies	 that	 developed	 into	 a	 carefully	
planned	and	executed	military	operation	reminiscent	of	World	War	I.	
The	war	was	fought	at	terrible	cost	with	an	estimated	70,000	people	
killed	and	thousands	more	displaced.	As	a	result	of	this	conflict,	the	
entire	border	area	between	the	two	countries	from	the	Sudan	in	the	
west	to	the	Djiboutian	border	in	the	east	remains	contaminated	with	
mines	and	ERW	today.
Interrelationship between Mines and ERW
As	 a	 result	 of	 these	 conflicts,	most	 of	Eritrea	 and	 the	northern	
areas	of	Ethiopia	remain	contaminated	with	mines	and	conventional	
ERW.	In	a	recent	incident,	a	truck	driver	collecting	stones	for	a	build-
ing	site	was	killed	when	his	vehicle	drove	over	a	landmine	on	a	vacant	
site	just	off	a	main	road	near	the	capital,	Asmara.	This	mine	was	a	
remnant	 of	 the	 independence	war	 years,	 quite	 possibly	 overlooked	
when	the	area	was	vacated.
In	examining	the	history	of	the	conflicts	that	have	engulfed	the	
region,	mines	and	ERW	are	interwoven	menaces	rather	than	separate	
entities.	 It	 is	 not	 safe	 to	 just	walk	 out	 to	 unexploded	 ordnance	 or	
an	abandoned	tank	and	attempt	to	remove	or	destroy	items	without	
operational	combat	failure	rates	of	U.S.	mu-
nitions.”27	 This	 is	 a	 remarkable	 admission	
because	it	has	broader	implications	than	just	
concerning	cluster	munitions.	But	consistent	
with	 nongovernmental	 organisation	 and	
field-based	evidence,	it	also	confirms	actual	
CBU	failure	rates	might	have	little	relation-
ship	with	official	“test”	claims.2
In	March	2006,	Timothy	McCormack,	a	
professor	of	international	humanitarian	law	
at	the	University	of	Melbourne	Law	School,	
led	a	review	of	the	responses	to	a	survey	by	
CCW	States	Parties	regarding	their	views	of	
the	relevance	of	IHL	principles	to	explosive	
remnants	 of	 war.	 McCormack	 concluded	
that	 the	CCW’s	Protocol	V	 should	be	 suf-
ficient	to	address	the	problem	of	ERW—but	
if	 not,	 and	 the	 problem	 “only	 increases	 in	
severity,”	the	call	for	a	ban	on	cluster	bombs	
should	 not	 be	 unexpected.	 Significantly,	
the	 report	 also	 argued	 that	 whatever	 the	
outcome,	 “the	 onus	 is	 on	 user	 states	 to	
demonstrate	that	such	weapons	can	be	used	
consistently	with	the	binding	obligations	of	
IHL”	(emphasis	added).29
The	 announcement	 that	 the	 Belgian	
government	 had	 adopted	 a	 comprehensive	
ban	 on	 cluster	 munitions	 sent	 a	 ripple	 of	
optimism	 through	 the	 Cluster	 Munition	
Coalition,	and	thanks	to	good	Belgian	tim-
ing,	it	arrived	just	in	advance	of	the	CCW	
meeting	of	States	Parties	in	March	2006.	In	
one	 swoop,	 the	Belgians	have	 changed	 the	
complexion	 of	 the	 cluster	 munitions	 cam-
paign.	While	 they	have	 set	 the	 bar	 high,30	
they	have	also	reinforced	the	belief	that	an	
international	 ban	 on	 something,	 not	 just	
clean-up	measures,	is	now	possible.	The	final	
ban	text	has	been	adopted	by	both	houses	of	
parliament	in	Belgium	as	of	this	writing.
While	 the	 most	 comprehensive	 ban	 is	
in	 Belgium	 (Austria	 is	 entering	 a	 parlia-
mentary	debate	on	a	 clusters	moratorium),	
several	other	states	have	made	their	reserva-
tions	known:	“Australia,	Belgium,	Canada,	
Denmark,	 France,	 Germany,	 Greece,	
Italy,	 the	 Netherlands,	 Norway,31	 Poland,	
Switzerland,	 the	United	 Kingdom	 and	 the	
United	States	have	plans	 to	withdraw	from	
service	 or	 have	 destroyed	 certain	 types	 of	
cluster	munitions.”32	Germany	and	Belgium	
are	considering	a	 strategy	of	narrowing	the	
definition	of	cluster	munitions	so	that	a	ban	
excludes	 advanced	models	 that	 are	 not	 ex-
pected	to	be	problematic.33	The	United	States	
is	not	Belgium,	but	even	the	U.S.	military,	
having	distributed	its	own	task-force	report	
in	 advance	 of	 the	CCW,	 seems	 to	 be	will-
ing	to	consider	major	changes	in	its	arsenal.	
For	the	first	time	in	a	long	time,	a	significant	
international	 restriction	 on	 certain	 cluster	
munitions	appears	to	be	within	reach.
Continuing Debates
From	 the	 start,	 many	 ICBL	 campaign-
ers	 had	 difficulty	 condoning	 technical	
measures	 to	 address	 high	 cluster-munition	
failure	 rates.	 They	 campaigned	 against	
self-destruction,	 self-deactivation	 and	 self-
neutralisation	solutions	for	APMs	and	worry	
that	 supporting	 technical	 fixes	 now	 may	
compromise	an	absolutist	principle	defended	
earlier.	However,	what	if	major	players	refuse	
to	join	an	all-out	ban	on	cluster	munitions,	
even	if	they	support	a	comprehensive	ban	on	
anti-personnel	mines?	
Controversy	 also	 surrounds	 the	 debate	
over	what	an	“acceptable”	failure	rate	might	
look	 like.	 Less	 than	 1-percent	 failure	 is	 a	
typical	cut-off	point,	but	is	also	arbitrary.	A	
very	 small	percentage	of	 a	 very	 large	num-
ber	 can	 still	 be	 a	 humanitarian	 disaster,	
albeit	 a	 much-reduced	 danger	 compared	
with	 that	produced	by	 a	10-	 to	30-percent	
failure	rate.
Yet,	 there	may	be	a	harm-reduction	im-
perative	to	prioritising	destruction	of	certain	
more	problematic	“worst	culprit”	munitions,	
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whatever	 the	 future	 holds	 for	 a	 complete	
ban.	 There	 is	 consensus	 within	 the	 CMC	
for	 a	 moratorium	 on	 use,	 production	 and	
trade	 of	 cluster	 munitions	 until	 their	 hu-
manitarian	 problems	 have	 been	 resolved—
but	 not	 everyone	 has	 been	 in	 favour	 of	
prioritising.3	Does	highlighting	the	bulk	of	
the	problem	legitimate	what	remains?	Some	
worry	that	humanitarian	law	will	be	ignored	
and	they	have	suggested	that	cluster	muni-
tions	might	 be	 used	more	 indiscriminately	
if	 their	 failure	 rates	 are	 “fixed.”	Will	mili-
taries	switch	to	other	bombs,	causing	more	
casualties,	 if	 cluster	 munitions	 are	 bann-	
ed	entirely?3
An	 interesting	 reverse-onus	 framework	
outlined	 by	 Landmine	 Action	 (UK)	 and	
consistent	 with	 one	 of	 the	 conclusions	 of	
the	McCormack	report	is	that	governments	
should	 recognise	 all	 cluster	 munitions	 are	
assumed	prohibited	unless	users	can	“opt	in”	
with	a	guarantee	that	a	particular	munition	
can	be	used	safely.36	Might	that	approach	fit	
nicely	with	the	destruction	of	legacy	muni-
tions	with	the	highest	failure	rates?	
A	final	point:	If	the	failure	rates	of	cluster	
munitions	were	reduced	to	nil	or	next	to	nil,	
would	there	remain	a	humanitarian	problem	
on	 a	 scale	 sufficient	 to	 sustain	 a	 campaign	
for	a	comprehensive	international	ban?
See Endnotes,” page 110
Near Erbil, Iraq: the CBU was released at too low an altitude and these BLU-97 submunitions hit the ground 
without arming. Their damaged state makes them unpredictable and very dangerous.
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